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Chapter 13
Research-Policy Dialogues in the United
Kingdom
Alistair Hunter and Christina Boswell
13.1 Introduction
Of the countries featured in this book, Britain has the longest experience of policy
interventions aimed at integrating migrants, beginning in the 1960s. The migrants
at whom policy was primarily directed had arrived in Britain after World War
II as British Commonwealth subjects, particularly from (former) colonies in the
Caribbean (e.g. Jamaica, Bahamas and Barbados), and South Asia (India, Pakistan
and present-day Bangladesh). Contrasting with the ‘guest-worker’ approach of
neighbouring countries like the Netherlands and Germany, Britain’s initial ‘open
door’ policy was not primarily conceived as a state-run recruitment campaign to
supply industry with cheap labour. Instead it was a diplomatic means by which
Britain hoped to maintain favourable economic and political relationships within
the Commonwealth (Banton 1985: 34).
A second specificity of the UK case is the long-standing British preference for
viewing questions of migrant integration through the conceptual prism of ‘race’.
From the late 1950s, the perception grew that ‘coloured’ Commonwealth migrants –
to reproduce the language of the period – were settling in Britain, and hence
competing with white working class communities for scarce resources such as
housing and jobs (Banton 1985: 35). The government action that followed combined
immigration control (the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act) with integration
measures (the 1965 Race Relations Act). Two subsequent Race Relations Acts
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(1968 and 1976) steadily built on this initial effort to contain racial discrimination
and maintain public order. The 1976 Act, by recognising indirect discrimination
against racial groups, in addition to the direct discrimination against individuals
which the first two Acts targeted, opened the door to the recognition of group
rights which emerged in multiculturalist policies promoting diversity in the 1980s.
However, a major break with multicultural race relations occurred after 2000 in
response to incidents of rioting and terrorism in which ethnic minorities (and above
all Muslims of South Asian heritage) were perceived to be implicated. Instead of
promoting diversity, integration policy took a ‘civic integrationist’ turn, emphasising
values held in common and promoting cross-community cohesion.
The British preference for conceptualising integration in ethnic terms requires
a brief explanation, since in neighbouring countries policy frames have tended to
distinguish between ‘citizens’ on the one hand, and ‘migrants’ (or ‘foreigners’) on
the other. In Britain, racial terminology did not have the same associations with
Nazism as it did in mainland Europe, and was familiar to policymakers due to
the legacy of British colonial administration. Furthermore, the citizen-foreigner
dichotomy was unusable in Britain given that most inhabitants of the country,
Commonwealth migrants and non-migrants alike, shared a (nominal) universal
status of citizenship (Joppke 1999). In this sense, integration policy in the UK
was never originally migrant integration policy, as the boundary across which
integration was supposed to occur (be it as a one-way process or a two-way
process) was not framed as a migrant/host boundary but as a racial boundary
separating people sharing the same (formal) citizenship status. The arrival of
653,000 Eastern European migrants in the UK between 2004 and 2011 (Vargas-Silva
2013), following the A-8 countries’ accession to the European Union, would come
to challenge this consensus. Thus far, however, integration policy – in the sense of
integrating new arrivals – continues to be a neglected domain (Spencer 2011).
As will be discussed in greater detail below, social scientific research on
integration has had a varied influence on the development of policy in this area, at
times making a very considerable impact on broad policy frames and specific policy
measures, while at other times having very little influence. This minimal influence is
certainly not due to an absence of knowledge production in this area: social scientists
have produced research on migrant integration for more than half a century. Equally,
the influence of social scientific knowledge on policy is not our only focus since that
relationship can also be two-way, with policymakers influencing the production of
knowledge in this domain.
13.2 Migrant Integration: Key Issues
The foundation stone of integration policy in the UK was the series of Race Rela-
tions Acts passed in the 1960s and 1970s. These were ‘path-breaking’ measures –
at least in the European context – aimed at combating discrimination on racial
grounds (Spencer 2011: 213) and ensuring that migrants (and their descendants)
13 Research-Policy Dialogues in the United Kingdom 235
were treated equally, as their status as citizens required. Rejecting assimilation, Roy
Jenkins – the Home Secretary who introduced these policies – defined integration
as ‘equal opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual
tolerance’ (in Rose 1969: 25).
Behind these lofty words lay a more pragmatic logic: public order was at
risk if such principles were ignored, as a series of ‘race riots’ in the late 1950s
had demonstrated (Favell 1998). As such, integration was a prerogative of the
Home Office. In order to minimise the potential for public disorder, the 1965 Act
banned racial discrimination in ‘places of public resort’ such as theatres, hotels,
bars, restaurants, and public transport. A second Act in 1968 extended the reach
of protection to other domains, such as employment and housing, after evidence
emerged of widespread discrimination in these areas.
The first Race Relations Acts required new bodies with which to implement and
police the legislation. At the national level, a newly instituted Race Relations Board
(RRB) was the agency charged with enforcing the 1965 and 1968 Acts. The 1976
Act created a new super-agency responsible both for the negative duty of enforcing
the anti-discrimination measures and for the positive duty of organising activities
with the aim of promoting good race relations. This new body was named the Com-
mission for Racial Equality (CRE), and it would continue as such until 2007 when
a successor agency, the Equality and Human Rights Commission, was created.1
One of the most far-reaching consequences of the 1976 Act was its focus on
indirect discrimination, ‘creat[ing] a space for the language of group rights’ which
in turn helped open the door for the multiculturalist policies of the 1980s (Joppke
1999: 230, 235). A central feature of multiculturalism relates to the prospect of
institutional adjustments on the part of the state, insofar as there is an implicit
multiculturalist understanding that integration is a two-way process of adaptation,
with both newcomers and host institutions adjusting their practices. In the UK,
institutional adjustments included the legal recognition of minority ethnic and
faith groups, such as in the collection of census data incorporating different group
categories (from 1991). Minor changes in law have been made to accommodate
cultural or religious practices espoused by different communities, for example in
relation to dress codes, children’s education, and ritual slaughter of animals. In
2000, responding to the Macpherson inquiry into police racism in a high-profile
murder case, the race relations legislation again evolved, extending the scope of the
1976 Act to impose a duty on all publicly funded bodies, including the police, to
eliminate discriminatory practices and to promote race equality.
In the summer of 2001, a series of focusing events prompted a reconsideration
of multiculturalism by policymakers. Firstly, major street disturbances occurred in
the northern English towns of Bradford, Burnley and Oldham, involving ethnic
minority youths. The ethnic minorities involved in the ‘milltown riots’ – so-called
due to the textile milling past of the three towns – were primarily of South Asian
1The CRE was active also in promoting academic research on race relations. The Journal of Ethnic
and Migration Studies, now one of the leading international academic journals in the field, began
life in 1971 as the CRE publication New Community.
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Muslim heritage. The subsequent 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington
contributed to a further hardening of the discourse around Muslims as a community
experiencing particular integration difficulties. Critiques of multiculturalism did
not issue solely from the right of the political spectrum, but also emanated from
prominent centre-left opinion makers (Alibhai-Brown 2001; Goodhart 2004). The
driving focus of policy henceforth was on measures that placed emphasis on the
cohesion of local communities and values that were shared in common, rather than
celebrating diversity.
The last decade has witnessed a consolidation of the rhetorical backlash against
multiculturalism.2 The election of a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition in
2010 did not result in any major deviations from the previous government’s focus
on cohesion and shared values. An overarching theme is to shift responsibility
for integration from central to local government. This shift began in 2006 when
responsibility for cohesion policy was switched from the Home Office to the newly
created Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG). The only
integration-related role that the Home Office retains is responsibility for the integra-
tion of refugees and naturalisation policy. These changes have led to some observers
denouncing an ‘extraordinary lack of coherence across Whitehall and between
central and local government’ (Spencer 2011: 233), with new migrants potentially
slipping through the resulting cracks. Similarly, the zeal of the government’s local-
ism drive is a cause of some concern (Katwala 2012), given the difficult financial
situation many local authorities found themselves in after the 2008 recession.
Statements such as ‘government will act only exceptionally’ imply a very minimalist
approach, absolving Whitehall of any responsibilities in this area (CLG 2012: 9).
13.3 Historical Overview of Research-Policy Dialogues
on Migrant Integration
In order to provide a comprehensive overview of science-society dialogues on
migrant integration in the UK, three constitutive components of these dialogues
will be studied. The first component refers to knowledge production about migrant
integration as a research field. What types of actors (research institutes, experts,
etc.) have emerged and what ‘schools of thought’ can be distinguished? Secondly,
we recognise that not all researchers are engaged with policymakers, politicians,
civil society and the media to the same degree. We use the term dialogue structures
to designate the principal actors involved, and the venues where they come together.
Finally, we ask how policymakers made use of the body of knowledge produced
in Britain on the topic of migrant integration. In order to analyse these patterns
of knowledge use, this chapter also follows Boswell’s (see Chap. 2) distinction
between instrumental, legitimising and substantiating knowledge utilisation.
2However, several academic observers argue that the substantive content of policy and discourse
continues as before, just under a different heading, i.e. ‘diversity.’ See Meer and Modood (2009)
and Vertovec and Wessendorf (2010).
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Table 13.1 Policy frames in British migrant integration policy since the 1960s
‘Race relations’ frame
‘Multicultural
race relations’
frame
‘Community
cohesion’
frame
Recent
developments
1965–c.1980 c.1980–2000 2001–2010 2010–2015
Normative
perspective
To maintain public
order and promote
equality of
opportunity
As previous,
plus: To
promote
cultural
diversity
To promote a
sense of
shared values
and belonging As previous
Terminology
Race; (indirect)
discrimination;
positive action
Race; group
rights;
institutional
racism
Cohesion;
bridging;
Britishness;
parallel lives;
Integration;
localism;
Main
policy
measures
Anti-discrimination
legislation; more
immigration
restrictions
Ethnic question
in census;
accommodation
of religious
practices (dress,
diet, education);
Race Relations
Act 2000
Changes to citizen-
ship/naturalisation;
focus on youth;
English language;
counter-extremism
As previous,
but
coordinated
by local not
central
government
Institutions
involved
Home Office; RRB;
CRE; local
authorities
Home Office;
CRE; local
authorities
CLG; Home
Office; local
authorities;
CRE / EHRC;
Local
authorities;
CLG and Home
Office (but
‘only
exceptionally’)
Source: Authors’ own elaboration
Because knowledge production, dialogue structures and knowledge utilisation
can be difficult to disentangle empirically, we shall not discuss them separately
here but instead focus on their mutual inter-relations in a chronological manner.
Table 13.1 provides an overview of four phases.
13.3.1 1940s to 1960s: The Emergence of the Race Relations
Frame
Sociological studies of migrant settlement and integration in the UK first date
to the 1940s, some considerable time before any explicit integration policies had
been devised by the authorities. Kenneth Little was the first to investigate ‘race
relations’ with his work in port cities such as Cardiff, where many sailors from
British colonies had settled (Little 1947). This direction of inquiry was continued by
Michael Banton, whose early work was supervised by Little at Edinburgh (Banton
1955). In the 1960s, John Rex and Robert Moore undertook a major study of migrant
housing in Birmingham, heavily influenced by Robert Park and the Chicago School
of sociology (Rex and Moore 1967).
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At this time, there was little instrumental use of academic research in policy-
making (Banton 1985). Where academics were most influential was in initially
framing questions of integration in terms of ‘race relations’, with academic output
inspiring ‘policy learning’ by politicians, civil servants, and the media (Bleich
2011). However, even here Bleich argues that ‘[s]ocial research ( : : : ) contributed
directly to the formulation of eventual dominant frames in Britain, but it was one of
a number of influences rather than constituting an overwhelming element’ (Bleich
2011: 62). This situation corresponds most closely to what Weiss (1986) calls the
‘enlightenment’ function of knowledge.
In this earlier period, examples of specific policy adjustments in which use
of integration research was central were more likely to be inspired by applied
research conducted outside academia, in what would now be termed think-tanks.
In this regard, an early and highly influential pioneer was the Institute of Race
Relations (IRR), originally founded in order to study race relations in colonial and
Commonwealth countries. By the early 1960s, however, its focus had shifted to race
relations in Britain itself, strongly influenced by academic and political currents in
the United States (Banton 2011a). In 1963 a major 5-year survey was launched by
the IRR, led by Jim Rose. This survey was later written up in the influential report,
Colour and Citizenship (Rose 1969). Another organisation, Political and Economic
Planning (PEP; later the Policy Studies Institute), also had a great influence on
policy, providing persuasive and incontrovertible evidence of discrimination.
However, such data was not used in an instrumental manner, to rationally adjust
policy, but rather used to substantiate an already-taken policy position (Boswell
2009). The passage of the 1968 Act is a paradigmatic example of this, as Banton
relates with regard to the commissioning of an influential PEP study in 1967. In
Banton’s view this study was ‘a set-up’ devised by Home Secretary Roy Jenkins,
his friend (and chairman of the Race Relations Board) Mark Bonham Carter, and
their contacts at PEP. Indeed Bonham Carter ‘made it a condition of his appointment
[to the Race Relations Board] that he should be able to put the case [for review of
the 1965 Act] after only a year’s operation’ (Lester 2000: 28). As Banton recounts,
‘The ’68 Act was an aspiration and it became a reality thanks to the [PEP] research
( : : : ). The government wanted to get a bill through the House of Commons and
it did’ (interview with Banton). Such remarks confirm Joppke’s depiction of an
‘elite-crafted’ race relations paradigm (1999: 225). This elite was constituted by
London-based political, media and legal figures, rather than academics at provincial
universities.
13.3.2 1970s: Fragmentation and Politicisation
Two principal features of migrant integration research in the UK become apparent
from 1970: simultaneously, the expansion of knowledge production in this area,
and the politicisation of the research field, resulting in competing schools of
thought. Academics such as Ambalavaner Sivanandan, Stuart Hall, Paul Gilroy and
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Robert Miles emerged who combined a Marxist perspective with a commitment to
combating racism politically through their academic work (Favell 2001: 356). Their
focus on racism (as opposed to race) put them at odds with sociologists such as
Banton and Rex who maintained that the term race could be deployed as a neutral
concept. The growing importance of the ‘critical race studies’ school3 is revealed by
the ‘capture’ of the IRR by Sivanandan and his supporters in 1972. Another locus
for this new paradigm was the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) at
the University of Birmingham.
Given the anti-system tendencies of academics in the ‘critical race studies’
school, it is no surprise that their writings were of little use to policymakers. One
might have expected more synergy between academia and policy in the official
venues created for dialogue. However, the first academic centre sponsored by the
Social Sciences Research Council (SSRC),4 led initially by Banton at Bristol (1970–
1978), was set up explicitly for the purposes of generating fundamental sociological
knowledge, not policy-relevant knowledge (Banton 2011b). Another attempt to
initiate dialogue was the creation of a Home Office Advisory Committee on Race
Relations Research (ACRRR) in 1969. The terms of reference for the committee
were: ‘To advise the Secretary of State on a programme of research likely to be
relevant to the formulation of policy concerning the relations between people of
colour, race or ethnic or national origins settled in Great Britain’ (ACRRR 1975: iii).
Despite its easy access to channels of power, this Committee was far from successful
in influencing the policy agenda. The initiative failed, largely because policymakers
were reacting to short-term problems rather than developing long-term visions for
policy:
That was an attempt to set up a place for exchange, and it failed, I think, completely ( : : : ).
The trouble was that the Home Office people were having to respond to ministers : : : And
ministers only wanted something when there was a problem (interview with committee
member).
13.3.3 1980s and 1990s: The Rise of Multiculturalist Thinkers
Despite the differences of opinion between the orthodox ‘race relations’ scholars
and the activist-academics of the critical school, common ground existed between
them in two important respects. The first was the shared tendency to frame British
experiences of ethnic diversity in relation to North American precedents. To this
‘Atlanto-centrism’, Tariq Modood (2012) adds a second ‘secularist’ bias. His
contention is that earlier researchers neglected the religious identities and practices
of post-Commonwealth immigrant communities in the UK, especially South Asian
communities. With the exception of some anthropological work on the religious
3Other authors refer to a ‘cultural studies school’ (see Favell 2001).
4After 1983 the SSRC becomes the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC).
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practices of South Asian migrants in Britain (Helweg 1979; Jeffery 1976; Werbner
1990), up until the 1990s there was little attention given to the influence of religion
in processes of settlement and integration. It was only after the Rushdie Affair
of 1989 that questions of accommodation of ethnic minority religions began to
generate sustained academic interest. In opposition to the secularist bias of earlier
research, multiculturalist thinkers emerged such as Modood, firstly at the Policy
Studies Institute and latterly at Bristol, and Bhikhu Parekh at Hull.
Other important research centres were emerging at this time. The directorship of
the government-funded SSRC unit transferred from Banton at Bristol to John Rex,
first at Aston and then to the Centre for Research on Ethnic Relations (CRER) at
Warwick. This centre became a launchpad for many researchers who have since
gone on to influential positions, such as John Solomos (editor of the journal Ethnic
and Racial Studies). This transfer of leadership also coincided with a shift from
the SSRC’s original emphasis on fundamental sociological research, moving to a
‘greater emphasis [on] policy relevant research and politically relevant research’
(Banton 2011b: 9). However, the pervading impression given by key informants
and literature on the topic is that CRER had difficulties fulfilling its new mission.
While CRER produced policy-relevant research (Favell 2001), the fact remains that
this material was not widely drawn on by policymakers. Peter Ratcliffe, who was
affiliated with CRER, admits that ‘the overall impact in terms both of minority
empowerment and in policy transformation was probably rather slight’ (Ratcliffe
2001: 130).
One can speculate that CRER might have been more successful if successive
Conservative governments had shown any interest in the race relations agenda.
According to a senior civil servant at the Home Office who covered the race relations
brief at the Home Office in 1978–1981 and then during the 1990s prior to retirement,
there was very little proactive dialogue on integration matters during the years of
Conservative rule (1979–1997). The race relations agenda was effectively ‘frozen’
at this time:
Direct systematic routine contact between academics to my memory did not exist at my
level. ( : : : ) We had no political impetus behind us to search people out. ( : : : ) Thatcher
set the tone : : : It was a failure of imagination, a failure to see what the country – simply
through demographics – was likely to become : : : Whatever the reasons, it did take the
political sea change of 1997 to bring it back into its right scale of importance (interview
with a former senior Home Office official).
13.3.4 1997 and After: The Quest for Policy Impact
The election of a Labour government in 1997 signalled a more proactive approach
(at least initially) to questions of race and integration (Ratcliffe 2001), evident in
the amendments in 2000 to the Race Relations Act, which introduced a new duty
on all public authorities to promote equal opportunities. New Labour’s election win
also had implications for the use of expert knowledge, with calls from ministers for
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evidence-based policymaking.5 This technocratic turn is observable in immigration
policy more generally (Boswell 2009), but in the integration field academics such
as Parekh and Modood were also quite influential at this time, ‘shaping that early
New Labour multiculturalism’ (interview with university researcher). However, this
pro-diversity discourse was turned on its head by two focusing events in summer
2001: the ‘milltown riots’ in northern England, followed by 9/11. It is at this point
that multiculturalist scholars begin to be sidelined. For example, while New Labour
politicians continued to solicit policy advice from Modood on some topics after
2001,6 Modood himself acknowledged that policymakers have taken other policy
directions that he was not willing to follow:
I’ve become less central or have been marginalised over the last decade ( : : : ) People in
Whitehall : : : think I’m not sufficiently addressing the most important issues which are to
do with terrorism, extremism, and so on, segregation, ghettoisation, separate communities
(interview with Modood).
However, other features of research-policy dialogues in earlier periods continued in
the 2000s. The key role played by think-tanks in dialogue structures on integration
has already been flagged, and in the 2000s more and more such organisations
became interested in this field. In addition to the Runnymede Trust and PSI, which
have long focused on race issues, left-of-centre think-tanks such as IPPR, Demos
and Policy Network, as well as Civitas and Policy Exchange on the right, have all
undertaken research in this area. Think-tanks provide a platform for academics to
broadcast their ideas in a way which is more likely to catch policymakers’ attention.
Think-tanks also act as bridge between academia and advisory positions within
government, as the career paths of a number of prominent actors show.7
In terms of knowledge utilisation, the trend observed in the earlier period
continues into the current timeframe. Once again there are not many examples
of instrumental knowledge use. This would be less surprising were it not for a
significant cultural change in academia, with a new willingness on the part of
academics to work on applied policy problems. Favell sees this as a dramatic shift:
In reading the citizenship and multicultural theorists of the present day, we need constant
reminding that they are not speaking from the same social location as the politicians,
judges, and bureaucrats who actually make decisions and implement policies. ( : : : ) One
by one, prominent academic voices have been incorporated into the wider, state-sponsored
production of practical knowledge (Favell 2001: 354–5).
One recent factor reinforcing this desire of academics to seek influence through
applied policy research is the clear shift that can be observed in the political
economy of university research funding. Since 2008, the Economic and Social
Research Council and the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE)
have required applicants for funding to demonstrate the likely socio-economic
5Speech by Secretary of State for Education and Employment David Blunkett to the ESRC, 2
February 2000. ‘Influence or Irrelevance: can social science improve government?’
6See Martínez 2013; also Government Equalities Office 2010.
7E.g. Sarah Spencer and Shamit Saggar.
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benefits of any proposed research. The same applies to the current nation-wide
evaluation of university research, the Research Excellence Framework (2008–
2014). Informants viewed this ‘chase’ after policy ‘impact’ as a key constraint.
Furthermore, this trend is not limited to public funding, since the various charitable
trusts that fund research in the UK, such as the Joseph Rowntree Foundation and
Barrow Cadbury Trust, also encourage researchers to seek demonstrable policy
impacts.
Funding from European Union sources has also acted as a significant influence
in this field. Not only has it driven engagement with new policymaking audiences in
the European institutions, it has also stimulated the growing internationalisation of
knowledge production. More internationally oriented (and comparativist) scholars
have begun to expose the deficiencies of analyses based on ‘national models’ of
integration. The Centre on Migration, Policy and Society at Oxford (COMPAS) in
particular has become the premier centre for migrant integration research in the UK
following this shift to internationalisation, supplanting the now defunct CRER at
Warwick.
Given this funding-driven growth in applied research, it is hardly surprising
that political actors tend to take primacy in coordinating research-policy dialogues
on migrant integration. One respondent commented: ‘I don’t think there is much
deference to the status of academics, at all, from policymakers. It’s certainly not
the case that people listen when a distinguished professor [speaks]’ (interview with
university researcher). The idea that it was normal for policymakers to be ‘on top’
and academic experts to be ‘on tap’ (Scholten 2011: 51) was made very clear in the
comments of Home Office officials, who decried the lack of policy-relevant research
on migration and integration. Their position was that researchers should be willing
to listen to policymakers in order to produce research which ‘[is] playing to the
themes which ministers, and often the public, feel are important’ (interview with
Home Office official).
A final feature of science-society dialogues on integration in the UK case is
the marked preference of policymakers to facilitate dialogues via one particular
venue, namely independent commissions. This venue preference has been noted
by a number of authors (Favell 2001; Scholten 2011). Ratcliffe finds commissions
to be especially prevalent in the UK following focusing events such as ‘race riots’
(Ratcliffe 2001). Commissions engage a wider set of actors beyond those normally
involved in policymaking, usually involving some combination of academics,
practitioners, and representatives of civil society. As such, commissions are an
ideal venue in which to study science-society dialogues, as we elaborate in the next
section.
13.4 Key Topics in Research-Policy Dialogues
We chose to focus on three government-sponsored or -endorsed commissions
reporting after 1999 that made recommendations across the three topics covered
by the DIAMINT project – naturalisation, religious diversity, and primary and
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secondary education. The three commissions are: the Commission on the Future
of Multi-Ethnic Britain in 2000 (CMEB); the Community Cohesion Review Team
(CCRT) in 2001; and the Commission on Integration and Cohesion in 2007 (CIC).
In what follows, we will consider the three integration topics in turn. For each topic
we will briefly discuss the context of that policy area, before analysing one of the
commissions in greater depth.
13.4.1 Naturalisation
In the second half of the twentieth century, British citizenship policy was not
designed to address the integration of migrants already in the UK but was instead
a means of immigration control, by limiting the categories of Commonwealth
citizens permitted access to the colonial metropole (Karatani 2002). Furthermore,
the process of acquiring British citizenship through naturalisation was marked by
a laissez-faire and bureaucratic nature. During his time as Home Secretary (2001–
2004), David Blunkett moved to change this, taking the view that the ‘prize’ of
citizenship should be (i) something to commemorate symbolically, and (ii) used as
a lever to encourage integration.
External policy advice was a key driver in this reinvention of UK naturalisation
policy, with the recommendations of experts on the Community Cohesion Review
Team (CCRT) being particularly influential. One of the two headline findings of
the CCRT – established following the 2001 ‘milltown riots’– was the need to
‘establish a greater sense of citizenship, based on (a few) common values which
are shared and observed by all’ (CCRT 2001: 9). The values deemed important by
the CCRT included ‘a universal acceptance of the English language’, support for
women’s rights, and respect for people of diverse faiths and beliefs (CCRT 2001:
19). It was also suggested that in relation to naturalisation procedures, ‘a clearer
statement of allegiance, perhaps along the lines of the Canadian model, should be
considered’ (CCRT 2001: 20). These proposals were enthusiastically backed by
ministers, both in the immediate response to Cantle’s report (Home Office 2001)
and in the government’s white paper8 Secure Borders, Safe Haven (Home Office
2002). Naturalisation policy was re-conceived as a lever for integration, particularly
with the requirement that new citizens should demonstrate knowledge of English
language and British institutions (Home Office 2002: 32). Citizenship ceremonies,
incorporating an updated oath of allegiance to ‘reflect a commitment to citizenship,
cohesion and community’, were also legislated for (ibid: 34).
Intriguingly, Cantle and his team were not the first policy advisors to suggest
that naturalisation should be reinvented as a means to promote a sense of belonging
8In UK policymaking, a ‘white paper’ is a document produced by the Government setting out
proposed changes to policy in a particular area.
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among newcomers. One year earlier, the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic
Britain (CMEB) had stressed the importance of renewing the British model of
citizenship. One measure proposed by the CMEB in this regard was to institute
citizenship ceremonies, transforming the process of gaining British citizenship from
a dull administrative process to a more symbolic ‘ceremonious form of welcome for
new British citizens which might help everyone to reflect on the value of citizenship
and to appreciate diversity’ (CMEB 2000: 55). These proposals did not receive the
same welcome from ministers as was accorded to the CCRT: in fact, the CMEB’s
recommendations were unceremoniously dropped. A closer analysis of the CMEB
shows why this was the case.
The CMEB was conceived by its sponsor the Runnymede Trust as a wide-ranging
state-of-the-nation sequel to the influential Colour and Citizenship report (Rose
1969), one of the founding texts of the British race relations paradigm. Chaired by
the eminent political philosopher Bhikhu Parekh, the Commission included some of
the leading academics in the race relations field,9 as well as expert practitioners in
the fields of law, health, local government, education, and journalism. Although
formally independent of government, the Commission had close ties to leading
figures in the ruling Labour Party and received strong backing from the Home
Secretary, Jack Straw, who presided at the launches of the Commission (January
1998) and its report (October 2000).
Ministers’ attitudes changed however once it became apparent that media
coverage of the report was overwhelmingly hostile. Journalists focused on one short
passage in the 417-page text: ‘Britishness : : : has systematic, largely unspoken,
racial connotations’ (CMEB 2000: 38). Mis-construing the word ‘racial’ for ‘racist’,
the Daily Telegraph led with a front-page story accusing commissioners of commit-
ting a racist slur against the British people, a criticism which was subsequently
taken up by mass media across the ideological spectrum. The report quickly
became a ‘politically untouchable document’ (McLaughlin and Neal 2004: 156),
and Jack Straw was forced to publicly distance the government from endorsing the
Commission’s findings. The CCRT by contrast did have the support of government,
and their recommendations on naturalisation were put into practice. Nonetheless,
it appears clear that the government’s initial inspiration to legislate in this area
came from the CMEB: the language of the Secure Borders, Safe Haven white paper
closely resembles the text of the CMEB report.10
9Academics on the commission included: Tariq Modood, Stuart Hall, Sarah Spencer, Sally
Tomlinson and Muhammad Anwar.
10Compare paragraphs 2.12 and 2.20 of Secure Borders, Safe Haven (Home Office 2002: 32, 34)
with paragraphs 4.33 and 4.34 of The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (CMEB 2000: 55).
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13.4.2 School Reception Policies
School-age education is considered to be a key arena of integration policy, applying
both to young migrants and second-generation children born in Britain. In British
statistical data, these two populations are collapsed into the category of black and
minority ethnic (BME) pupils. Over the decades, the educational attainment of BME
school-leavers has advanced significantly: overall BME pupils are close to attaining
parity with, or even overtaking, their white counterparts on the standard measure
of percentage of pupils attaining five passes at GCSE level11 (A-C grades). The
national average is 76 %, compared with 80 % for Asian pupils.12 74 % of black
pupils achieve such grades.
Given these generally positive outcomes, socio-economic disadvantage and
differential school attainment among ethnic groups have been less prominent in
recent UK policy debates than in other countries studied in this volume. Instead,
the integration focus in schools has primarily been on socio-cultural aspects,
particularly educational segregation and the lack of contact between pupils of
different ethnic backgrounds. In 2001, the influential Cantle report identified
‘separate educational arrangements’, such as faith schools or mono-ethnic schools,
as a major factor behind the CCRT’s diagnosis of ‘parallel lives’, since it was
primarily young people who participated in the 2001 disturbances (CCRT 2001:
9).
In response, the CCRT recommended a number of measures in schools to
promote cross-cultural bridging. A legal duty on schools was proposed to ‘promote
respect for, and understanding of, the cultures in the school and neighbouring areas’
(ibid: 36). This recommendation was eventually implemented in the duty on schools
to promote community cohesion, as legislated for in the Education and Inspection
Act of 2006. ‘School-twinning’ initiatives enabling pupils from different schools
(and ethnic backgrounds) to participate in shared lessons and sports activities were
given enthusiastic backing by the Review Team, and extra funding was made
available by government for this (Home Office 2001: 24).
What factors led to the CCRT being such a productive research-policy dialogue?
Compared with the CMEB, its remit was far narrower, even to the point of
stipulating who should be consulted: commissioners were asked ‘to obtain the
views of local communities, including young people, local authorities and faith
organisations : : : on the issues that need to be addressed in developing confident,
active communities and social cohesion’ (CCRT 2001: 5). Ted Cantle, a senior
local government leader, was asked to chair the Review. His previous role at the
Association of Metropolitan Authorities meant that several Labour ministers knew
him as ‘a “safe officer” type person, who was capable of writing a report and
presenting findings’ (interview with Cantle).
11GCSE stands for General Certificate of Secondary Education. It is not possible to leave school
before sitting these exams, usually at age 15–16.
12All the statistics given in this paragraph are drawn from a special report Race in Britain 2012
which appeared in the Independent on Sunday on 8 January 2012.
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The choice of the trusted Cantle as chair, the narrow terms of reference, and
the appointment of practically minded commissioners with grassroots experience
in local government and community organisations, indicate that ministers were
keen for the Review to produce pragmatic and politically savvy recommendations
which could be taken up by policymakers. In particular, a number of observers
have contended that the CCRT was primarily a government-controlled vehicle
to substantiate a shift in policy from multiculturalism to community cohesion
(Robinson 2008: 17–19). Yet interviews conducted for the DIAMINT project
suggest a more nuanced reading. With a ‘safe pair of hands’ as chair, ministers
did not need to intervene:
It wasn’t a nurse-maiding approach. There was certainly nothing about no-go areas, or
nothing about ‘you’ve got to do so-and-so.’ I can imagine that does happen in other types
of reviews, but in this one, I think we just struck lucky with Ted (interview with minister).
Furthermore, the CCRT went beyond merely supporting pre-given policies, with
a number of detailed proposals which drew on members’ knowledge of local
government practices and which were subsequently taken up by national policymak-
ers. Thus, the CCRT appears to have served both substantiating and instrumental
functions. The report’s largely positive reception in both right- and left-wing
media, and praise for Blunkett’s straight talking on the issue from right-of-centre
journalists, signalled to government that there was an appetite for policy change
among the public. Cantle’s subsequent career shift to academia at the Institute for
Community Cohesion, which enabled him to closely monitor implementation of the
CCRT proposals, is a striking example of ‘role swap’ among knowledge users and
producers (Caponio et al. forthcoming).
13.4.3 Religious Diversity
Migratory flows to the UK have long been characterised by religious diversity.
After World War II, Caribbean migrants brought with them more evangelical forms
of Christianity, while Hindu, Muslim and Sikh beliefs travelled with South Asian
migrants. Until recently, accommodation of this migration-driven religious diversity
was perceived by policymakers to be relatively unproblematic (e.g. provision of
halal food, planning permission for places of worship, and dress-code exceptions for
public sector workers), with accommodations being made primarily on the basis of
race relations legislation (Abbas 2009). However, since the 1990s religion has been
recognised as a group identity which requires firmer legal protection, in the wake of
South Asian communities making claims on the basis of religious identity rather
than race. This trend gained momentum following the controversy over British-
Indian novelist Salman Rushdie’s book The Satanic Verses in 1989 (Asad 1990).
However, the protection of religious ‘difference’ has been subject to critique in
recent years. After 2000 the government felt that more actions should be taken to
bring different faith groups together rather than encouraging single group identities.
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This was first proposed in Cantle’s report following the 2001 ‘milltown riots’, and
was given considerable attention subsequently by the Commission on Integration
and Cohesion (CIC) sponsored by the Department for Communities and Local
Government (CLG) in 2006–2007.
While the experts on the CIC acknowledged that ‘religious faith is profoundly
important to those whose lives it shapes and is potentially a unifying force within
society’, they also noted its potential to be ‘a factor that separates people from the
wider community – for example, in many of the areas where ‘parallel lives’ are
most in evidence’ (CIC 2007: 86). One recommendation which aimed at reducing
the divisive force of religion was the presumption against single group funding,
(including of faith groups), in preference to awarding funds to promote inter-faith
activities (CIC 2007: 137 and Annex D). This proposal was inspired by academic
work on social capital, and in particular Robert Putnam’s distinction between
‘bridging’ and ‘bonding’ types (Putnam 2000).
However, in CLG’s response to the CIC, it was clear that policymakers had
reservations about prohibiting single-group funding, noting that ‘the thinking behind
it has in some areas been misunderstood’ (CLG 2008: 30). CLG also acknowledged
fears from voluntary organisations that their funding would be cut, such as Muslim
organisations engaged in preventing violent extremism. Eventually, the CIC’s
recommendation against single-group funding was watered down to leaving matters
to the discretion of Local Authorities. More broadly, the Commission can be viewed
as a failed attempt to shift the paradigm away from cohesion of established ethnic
communities towards recognition of Britain as ‘super-diverse’, and the need for
integration of new migrant communities. It is worth elaborating briefly on the
reasons behind this failure.
The origins of the CIC lie in the government’s initial response to the 7/7 London
terrorist attacks in 2005. A commission to review the role of religion in Britain was
announced by the Home Office in September 2005. However, a reorganisation of
Whitehall in May 2006 led to the newly created Department for Communities and
Local Government taking over the commission. Simultaneously, its remit shifted
from religious diversity to an interest in ‘how local areas can play a role in forging
cohesive and resilient communities’ (CIC 2007: 17). The lack of urgency and focus
that characterised the commission’s genesis indicates that it was designed as a
‘delaying tactic’ by ministers, a knowledge use function we term ‘legitimising’.
This is confirmed by the way the CIC report was disseminated and received by
policymakers, with the substance of the report being less important than publicly
signalling that a rigorous and authoritative review had taken place:
All of the news coverage of the report is on the day before the report, which talks about
what’s in the report without the report ever having been available. And it is not that it is
a pack of lies, but it picks certain things and gives them high profile, forgets most of the
report, in a very selective manner. And of course, by the time the report is out, the news is
dead : : : the news cycle has moved on. So nobody’s that interested in reading the report,
paradoxically (interview with commissioner).
Once the brief flurry of media interest had abated, the Commission disappeared from
the policy agenda quite quickly. In contrast to the government’s rapid response to
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the Cantle and Parekh reports, eight months had elapsed before CLG fully assessed
the report and revealed which recommendations it planned to take forward (CLG
2008). While the government’s rhetoric was broadly supportive, few of the headline
recommendations were implemented in practice: for example, the flagship proposal
for a centrally funded Integration Agency was rejected following a feasibility
study. This leads us to conclude that the CIC’s policy advice primarily served a
legitimising function for the commission’s sponsors in government.
13.5 Conclusions
The early production of social scientific knowledge on the question of migrant
integration in Britain was characterised by consensus, with an agreement that
the approach to the question should focus on the concept of ‘race relations’. In
looking to North American concepts of race, British scholarship on integration was
launched on a trajectory quite distinct from approaches in neighbouring European
countries. Furthermore, scholarship on integration, broadly defined, appears to have
emerged in Britain some years before academics in neighbouring countries began
to study such issues. Nonetheless, in this early period there was little proactive
dialogue between research and policy, with academics preferring to engage in
fundamental rather than applied research. Academic research did however have
an indirect influence on policymaking, with the ‘race relations’ frame gaining
acceptance among politicians, journalists and civil servants (Bleich 2011). This
boundary configuration can be characterised as one of ‘enlightenment’ (Scholten
2011). By contrast, research produced by think-tanks (but strongly influenced by
ministers) fed directly into policymaking at certain important junctures, such as the
passage of the 1968 Race Relations Act, indicating an intermittent ‘engineering’
boundary configuration (Scholten 2011).
The 1970s and 1980s were marked by a growing politicisation and fragmentation
of the field, leading to the emergence of rival schools of thought. The ‘critical race
studies’ school was characterised by its politicised anti-racist perspective, set against
the value-free position of earlier sociologists who sought to deploy race as a neutral
concept. In the 1980s and 1990s, multiculturalism came to the fore, with its critique
that earlier research had neglected the religious identities and practices of migrant
communities, especially from South Asia. The impact of these emerging schools of
thought on policy was limited, however, partly due to the anti-system tendencies of
the Marxist scholars in the ‘critical race’ school, and partly due to the inactivity of
successive Conservative governments regarding migrant integration.
In sum, the range of discourse coalitions and actors involved in UK science-
society dialogues has increased markedly. British academia has also opened up
internationally. In part, the catalyst for this internationalisation has been the
emerging political economy of research in the UK, and importantly also in the
Europe Union, in which international recognition and collaboration is an indicator
of esteem. In addition, an interesting feature of the UK case has been policymakers’
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long-standing preference for integration dialogues to take place in government-
sponsored commissions. Since the 1980s, such commissions have tended to be
launched after significant focusing events, usually an outbreak of disorder or
violence, be it race riots, racist murders, or acts of terrorism.
We developed this insight by suggesting that independent commissions are an
ideal venue to study science-society dialogues, since they involve a wider set
of actors than is normally included in policymaking, usually a combination of
academics, practitioners, and representatives of civil society (see also Chap. 5 for
a comparison between similar commissions in Germany and the Netherlands). Fur-
thermore, evidence-gathering about complex social problems is a primary activity
of commissions, and commissions therefore often draw upon social science data
and deploy social research methods. Accordingly, we compared three commissions
which reported in the 2000s: the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain
in 2000 (CMEB); the Community Cohesion Review Team (CCRT) in 2001; and the
Commission on Integration and Cohesion in 2007 (CIC).
The findings of the CCRT – most subject to government influence of the three –
were used for both instrumental and substantiating purposes. The choice of the
trusted Cantle as chair, the narrow terms of reference, and the stress on ‘making
things happen’, all indicate it was geared towardss substantiating the new policy
paradigm of community cohesion. However, the commissioners drew up a number
of detailed policy proposals, which exceeded policymakers’ expectations, and these
proposals subsequently contributed to policymaking in an instrumental fashion. The
CIC, by contrast, is judged to fit most closely to what we term the ‘legitimising’
function of knowledge use. Its drawn-out launch and proceedings, its broad remit,
and the lack of interest paid to its findings, meant that the commission’s output
was not used to rationally adjust policy instruments. Instead, the manner in which
findings were disseminated via the media indicates that policymakers were anxious
to signal to the public that action was being taken to address what was perceived to
be an urgent problem, highlighted by the London bombings.
Interestingly, we also found that the amount and duration of media coverage
is more important than whether such coverage is favourable or not. This is
demonstrated by the history of the CMEB, which was launched not by government
but by the Runnymede Trust think-tank (although with close backing from senior
government politicians). The CMEB’s composition and workings indicate a partly
instrumental and partly legitimising role. On the one hand, its sponsors and
supporters intended and expected that it would influence policy. Yet Runnymede’s
trustees and the commission’s Labour backers also appear to be motivated by a
desire to signal the commission’s authority and significance. Interestingly, the initial
media reaction to the CMEB report was extremely unfavourable. Yet the long-
running controversy that the CMEB report generated in the media meant that its
various proposals were debated at length. Thus, the CMEB remained in the public
spotlight, and therefore on the policymaking agenda. In time, many of its findings
and recommendations were in fact implemented, corresponding to what Carole
Weiss terms the ‘enlightenment’ function of knowledge.
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